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Abstract 
Using information on Japanese, UK, and German workers’ work hour and matched 
firms’ characteristics, this paper investigates whether the number of hours worked is 
determined by demand-side factors, and tries to introduce one possibility to explain 
why Japanese tend to work longer hours than workers in other countries. Based on an 
empirical framework that each firm sets a minimum boundary of work hours, and 
workers hired by the firm are not able to work less than the minimum requirement, 
we found that the minimum requirement depends on the fixed costs of labor that the 
firm bears. Specifically, firms that tend to conduct labor hoarding during recessions, 
presumably because of higher fixed costs, require incumbent workers to work longer 
hours. We also found that the greater the workers’ firm-specific skills, the more firms 
placed demands on these workers to work longer hours, given other things are equal. 
Since Japanese firms have long been considered to bear large fixed costs to train 
workers, we interpret the long work hour requirement as a rational strategy for 
Japanese firms to protect those workers that have accumulated high skills from 
dismissal. In other words, the long work hours of Japanese workers reflect the 
practice of long-term employment, a typical feature of the Japanese labor market.
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I.  Introduction 
 
Japan has long being categorized as a nation working long hours. According to 
comparable statistics provided by OECD (2010), for example, 18% of Japanese male 
employees worked more than 60 hours per week in 2007, whereas the corresponding 
figures for British and German males were 7% and 4%, respectively. As such evidence 
shows, Japanese have been often considered workaholic by the international standard. 
However, do Japanese work long hours by their own choice, or are they forced to work 
longer from any constraints set by the firms in which they are employed? As described 
in more detail in the next section, many Japanese think that they are over-employed and 
want to reduce their work hours given the current wage rate. Using information on 
workers’ work hour preferences and matched firm-worker characteristics, this paper 
examines how the number of hours worked is affected by demand-side factors, and tries 
to introduce one possibility to explain the large differences in the number of hours 
worked among countries.
1 
The canonical model of labor supply states that a worker can flexibly choose 
his/her own work hours to maximize the person’s utility at any given wage. However, 
findings from several studies suggest that in reality workers cannot choose work hours 
freely. For example, in his survey on labor supply, Heckman (1993) concludes that most 
of the variability in labor supply can be explained by extensive margins (i.e., workers’ 
flows into and from the labor market), whereas intensive margins (i.e., changes in hours 
worked) are extremely small. In fact, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2008) show that the 
intensive margin of Japanese workers is nearly zero, endorsing Heckman’s conclusion. 
Using job-mover data, Altonji and Paxton (1986, 1988, 1992), Senesky (2004), and 
Martinez-Granado (2005) suggest that choices of wages and hours are only available as 
a “package”; therefore, a worker is not able to flexibly change work hours unless he/she 
changes jobs. Many studies, including Moffitt (1982), Stewart and Swaffield (1997), 
and Bryan (2004), confirm that some proportion of workers face work hour constraints 
and are unable to choose work hours freely. These studies suggest that the determination 
of work hours is heavily dependent on the demand side. Therefore, work hour 
constraints due to demand factors should be incorporated in estimations of the labor 
supply function. 
While most of these studies concentrate on estimating the wage elasticity of 
work hours by incorporating such constraints, only a few focus on the determinants of 
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the work hour constraints themselves—such as Stewart and Swaffield (1997), Doiron 
(2003), and Bryan (2004). They explicitly examine how demand factors affect the lower 
bound of work hours, although due to lack of detailed data, only limited information 
such as the local unemployment rate or firm size is used to specify the demand-side 
factors.
2 This paper provides further evidence that hours worked are affected by 
demand-related factors, using information from the employers’ side not available in 
usual household surveys. Specifically, our advantage would be the rich information on 
workplaces and firms extracted from two surveys: an original multi-country workers’ 
survey on Japan, the UK, and Germany and an original matched firm-worker data on 
Japan, designed to link with the annual official firm panel survey (Basic Survey of 
Business and Activities  [BSBA], Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry). As 
explained in more detail in the next section, several previous studies have pointed out 
that demand for work hours is an increasing function of the user cost of labor. Because 
of the lack of firm-side information at the micro level, however, very few empirical 
studies have investigated this point. As a possible determinant of work hours, therefore, 
we focus on the factors that reflect the size of fixed costs of labor or the accumulation of 
firm-specific skills. Besides fixed costs, we also test the possibility that better 
workplace management would reduce the inefficiently long work hours. From the two 
data mentioned above, we extract information such as the firms’ practices on 
employment adjustment during previous recessions, HRM and work-life-balance 
policies, and the degree of firm-specific skills of employees. We then utilize the 
information on workers’ work hour preferences to investigate whether these firm-side 
factors are important determinants of work hours. 
This paper is summarized as follows. First, a common feature is observed for 
all three countries (Japan, the UK, and Germany) regarding information from the 
workers side. That is, workers are required to work longer hours in workplaces where 
labor hoarding was observed during recessions compared to other workplaces. Second, 
we draw the same conclusion, focusing further on this feature using Japanese 
firm-worker matched data. Specifically, those firms that have largely adjusted the 
number of employees in previous recessions tend to demand significantly shorter work 
hours than those that have engaged in labor-hoarding practices, given the same negative 
shock. We interpret these results as follows: Labor-hoarding firms require incumbent 
workers to work long hours instead of hiring extra workers, and use such long overtime 
                                                  
2 Bryan (2007) also emphasizes the importance of firm-specific factors on work hours, indicating 
that nearly a third of the explained variation in work hours can be ascribed to firm-level 
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work hours as a buffer to adjust personnel costs when a negative shock occurs. Thus, it 
may be argued that longer work hours by Japanese reflect the long-term employment 
system with high skill accumulation, which has been the typical feature of the Japanese 
labor market. Third, we also find that good HRM practices can serve as a device to 
reduce demand for work hours. This implies that there is still room for workplaces in 
Japan (where work hours are inefficiently long) to achieve a work-life-balance even 
under the traditional labor-hoarding environment. 
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section II, we explain our data and 
observe some basic facts regarding the actual and desired work hours among Japanese, 
British, and German workers. In Section III, we briefly describe the theoretical 
background of why actual hours worked diverge from the desired hours, and introduce 
our empirical model to access the theory. Section IV shows the results using data from a 
cross-country survey on workers and Japanese firm-worker matched data. Section V 
concludes the paper. 
 
 
II.  Data and basic facts 
 
(1) Data 
The data used in this paper are mainly from the Work-Life Balance Survey in Japan and 
Europe (hereafter, WLB-JE), which was conducted in December 2010 by the Research 
Institute for Economy, Trade, and Industry (RIETI) of the Ministry of Economy, Trade, 
and Industry (METI). The WLB-JE consists of two strands: the matched firm-worker 
survey for Japanese firms and employees and the multi-country employee survey for 
Japanese, UK, and German employees.
3 
The matched firm-worker survey was conducted among firms that employ 
more than 100 employees to collect firm-side information on their human resource 
management (HRM) practices and policies to enhance worker’s work-life balance 
(WLB) along with basic firm characteristics. The questionnaire was sent to the 9,628 
firms that had responded to the BSBA conducted by METI. By matching the WLB-JE 
firm survey with the BSBA, the basic business-related information such as the past 
variation in the number of employees and sale amounts from their profit and loss 
statements becomes available. The respondent firms were also asked to choose more 
than five white-collar employees in their firm and hand out the questionnaire of the 
WLB-JE employee survey to them. Those employees were then asked to return the 
                                                  
3  As project members, we contributed to designing the questionnaires for these surveys. 4 
 
questionnaire by mail after filling in the information on their actual and desired hours 
worked, wage, job tenure, job and HRM characteristics in their workplace, and other 
basic employee characteristics. As a result, information on 1,677 firms out of the 9,628 
(which correspond to a 17.4% response rate) and 10,055 matched employees was 
available for the WLB-JE. 
The cross-country employee survey, aimed to complement the 
above-mentioned Japanese matched firm-worker survey, was conducted via Internet so 
that the same questions were asked of white-collar employees working in the UK and 
Germany. The targeted employees worked for firms with more than 250 employees. The 
number of employees available was 979 in the UK and 1,012 in Germany. 
  From the WLB-JE, we use white-collar regular employees above 20 years old 
who usually work more than 20 hours a week. After removing outlier and missing 
values, our sample consists of 7,135 Japanese employees (4,958 males and 2,177 
females) in 1,524 firms, 854 (392 males and 462 females) UK employees, and 875 (462 
males and 413 females) German employees. 
 
(2) Basic facts 
Table 1 compares weekly hours worked and the ratio of long-hour workers among 
Japanese, UK, and German employees. The table indicates the average hours worked by 
Japanese males is much longer than others. Japanese males work 47 hours a week on 
average, and those working more than 50 hours (60 hours) a week amount to 40% 
(10%), which is much larger than for UK and German males. Although female 
employees also work longer in Japan, the differences in hours worked and ratio of 
long-hour workers are not so large as compared to UK and German females. 
To check for the potential sampling bias in the WLB-JE data, we also 
calculated the average hours worked by adjusting the differences in individual 
characteristics among the three countries (see Table 1). Specifically, we first estimated 
the hours worked for each country, using individual characteristics such as age, tenure, 
tenure squared, manager dummy, occupation dummies, industry dummies, firm size 
dummies, marital status dummy, and child dummy. Then, applying Japanese data with 
the estimated coefficient for the UK or Germany, we derived the hours worked, adjusted 
for the potential differences in individual characteristics. Comparing the adjusted work 
hours with the original, we find no major changes in the differences of weekly hours 
worked and the ratio of long-hour workers among the three countries, suggesting that 
Japanese males work much longer than UK and German males. 
We also compared hours worked in WLB-JE data with representative panel 5 
 
data in each country. Table 2 summarizes weekly hours worked by white-collar 
employees and the ratio of those employees working more than 50 hours, using the Keio 
Panel Household Survey (KHPS), the British Panel Household Survey (BHPS), and the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSEOP). From Table 2, we find that the hours worked 
in each representative panel survey for 2004–2008 are longer than in our WLB-JE 
sample. This might be due to the difference in the survey year, since the WLB-JE was 
conducted after the financial crisis of 2008. However, even using 2010 data, only 
available for Japan, we find the average hours worked for both males and females are 
longer in the KHPS datasets. This implies that our WLB-JE samples might include a 
relatively larger proportion of workers who work shorter hours compared with the three 
countries’ national averages. 
  Next, we considered worker’s preferences for working hours to check the 
possible constraints on hours worked. In the WLB-JE, the respondents were asked to 
answer the following questions: If you could choose your working hours at your current 
hourly rate of pay, would you choose to increase or decrease the number of hours you 
work? If yes, by how much? The answers, summarized in Table 3, suggest the potential 
constraints for hours worked. Those who prefer to work more hours (or face the upper 
constraint), constitute about 10% in each country. On the other hand, the ratio of those 
who prefer to work less (or face the lower constraint) differs a lot across countries; more 
than a quarter of Japanese respondents declare that they want to decrease their work 
hours, whereas the proportion of such respondents is much smaller for both UK and 
Germany. As a result, the average number of hours worked that respondents want to 
change is about -1.6 hours for Japanese males, which is much larger compared with UK 
and German males. Furthermore, comparing the actual and preferred hours worked in 
Figure 1, we see that long-hours-working employees, especially Japanese males, tend to 
prefer shorter work hours. 
  These results imply that many Japanese employees face firms’ work hour 
constraints that force them to work longer than workers’ preferences. The evidence that 
a large proportion of workers face work hour constraints suggests that the demand-side 
factors have a great influence on Japanese workers who work long hours. In what 
follows, we estimate the firm’s demand function for work hours and try to specify the 





III. Theoretical and empirical framework 
 
(1) Theoretical background 
As briefly mentioned in the Introduction, a strand of literature on labor supply has long 
suggested that because of firms’ fixed costs to employ workers and individual costs to 
move between jobs or firms, hours worked are considerably influenced and determined 
by the firm; workers cannot freely choose the number of hours they work, at least in the 
short run. To mention an early example, Rosen (1969) pointed out that due to factors 
such as hiring or specific training costs, firms’ demand for work hours is an increasing 
function of the user cost of labor.
4 More recently, Kahn and Lang (1991, 1992) tested 
whether long-term contracts suggested by either the agency model (Lazear, 1981) or the 
firm-specific human capital model (Mincer,1974; Becker, 1964) may specify hours of 
work that deviate from the spot market level. They obtain favorable (but weak) results 
for the firm-specific human capital model to explain the workers’ work hour constraints. 
Specifically, they suggest that firm-specific human capital makes long-term 
employment relationships desirable for workers and firms, and by sharing in the 
investment in human capital both parties ensure against a withdrawal by either. In this 
setting, the investment is shared by setting the wages in the early years above the value 
of the marginal product, but below the alternative wages. The implications of this model 
for work hour restrictions is that a firm will restrict low-tenure workers from working 
more hours, while making long-tenured (thus, highly skilled) employees to work longer. 
In other words, these studies suggest that the larger the fixed costs of hiring and training 
a worker, the longer the firm requires the invested workers to work, indicating the 
positive correlation between fixed costs and work hours. 
While the above authors focus on the cross-sectional variation of work hours 
among individuals, some studies emphasize the business cycle variation of work hours 
when firms incur fixed costs. In general, if firms incur large fixed costs of labor, it is 
likely that they adjust labor costs by using work hours in recessions to prevent those 
costs from being sunk. For example, Nickell (1978) shows theoretically that if fixed 
costs increase, the period of work hour adjustment and labor hoarding would become 
longer. If this is true, higher fixed costs would require a firm to make work hours more 
flexible. Therefore, such firms would keep work hours longer during a normal period in 
order to save for future negative shocks. In a similar context, Hunt (2000) empirically 
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shows that more flexible use of short hours slows the adjustment of the number of 
workers based on the German experience. In Germany, the use of short time (reduction 
below the standard hours) by union-firm negotiation was widespread during the 1980s, 
and this flexibility in work hours served as a buffer to protect workers from dismissal. 
The German experience shows that if hours can be reduced far below the standard 
workweek, long work hours during a normal period may not be necessary. However, we 
assume such type of adjustment is not common, since there is a downward rigidity in 
the nominal standard wage.
5 For example, in Japan, Kuroda and Yamamoto (2003a, 
2003b) show that downward nominal wage rigidity was observed in the severe 
deflationary recession of the 1990s. If reducing hours below the standard workweek is 
difficult, firms need to set demand for hours above the standard to make room for 
adjustment when a negative shock occurs. 
All these studies suggest that high training costs, or accumulated firm-specific 
human capital, may be an important factor determining the length of work hours. 
Japanese firms have long been considered to emphasize employee training in order to 
accumulate firm-specific human skills. We presume that this may be one of the reasons 
why Japanese work longer hours than people in other countries. For example, Mincer 
and Higuchi (1988) find that the wage profile of Japanese firms is much steeper than 
that of US firms. Some empirical findings indicate that many Japanese firms practice 
long-term employment, by comparing the adjustment speed of employment and work 
hours when a negative shock occurs (e.g., Shinozuka and Ishihara, 1977; Tachibanaki, 
1987; Abraham and Houseman, 1989). Many of them suggest that the adjustment of 
employment is significantly greater in other countries than in Japan while that of work 
hours is greater in Japan, suggesting strong labor-hoarding practices by Japanese firms. 
Such behavior has been interpreted as a consequence of protecting regular workers who 
have accumulated high human skills at heavy training costs against dismissal.
6 
Although much research has focused on the differences in the speed of employment 
                                                  
5 According to Hunt (2000), in Germany, workers put on short time receive short-time benefits, 
which replace the same proportion of their lost earnings as unemployment insurance would if they 
were fully unemployed, and such benefits may last up to two years during recessions. This policy 
indicates such nationwide insurance system to compensate wage cuts is necessary to make standard 
hours flexible. 
6  Even after the prolonged recession since the early 1990s (the so-called lost decade of Japan), Kato 
(2001) finds that Japan’s long-term employment system still endures. Kambayashi and Kato (2011) 
also find that the job stability of regular employees was not affected much, especially during the first 
five years of Japan’s Great Recession following the bubble. However, they also suggest that the job 
stability of regular employees eventually declined somewhat during the final years of the Great 
Recession. Further data accumulation is needed to test whether the Japanese traditional employment 
system has changed completely in response to Japan’s prolonged recession. 8 
 
adjustment, very few studies have looked into the adjustment cost or fixed-cost 
differences to explain the work hour differences among countries. In the following 
analysis, we investigate, by employing several variables as proxies for high fixed costs, 
whether these factors can explain why Japanese workers’ long work hours. 
 
(2) Empirical framework 
Following the method developed by Stewart and Swaffield (1997), we use work hour 
constraints to identify and estimate the firm’s demand function for work hours. We 
consider the following friction model in which working hours are observed depending 
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where  hi represents the observed log work hours of employee i;  hi
* indicates the 
preferred log work hours of employee i; xi is a vector of demand factors that determine 
the lower bound of work hours; β is its coefficient vector; mi is a vector of demand and 
supply factors that affect the upper bound of work hours; γ is its coefficient vector; and 
εi is an error component. 
We assume that a firm sets a lower bound of work hours, xiβ, and an upper 
bound, xiβ+miγ, for each employee. The lower bound is determined by the firm and 
employee characteristics xi, which include hourly wage
7, age, tenure, tenure squared, 
university graduates dummy, manager dummy, occupation dummies, firm size dummies, 
and the proxies for the fixed labor costs, which we explain in detail below. We 
especially expect that larger fixed labor costs would increase the firm’s demand for 
work hours. The upper bound is assumed to be higher than the lower bound by miγ, 
which consists of a constant term plus other factors. We assume the upper bound is 
affected by the exemption from overtime regulations, which reflects the firms’ cost for 
overtime pay. Since we do not have exact information on exemption, we instead 
incorporate manager dummy as a proxy. We also consider the case where the upper 
                                                  
7 Hourly wage is calculated by dividing annual wage income by annual hours worked (=weekly 
hours worked times 52). Since each respondent was asked annual wage income in local currency, we 
converted wages of UK and German workers into yen using OECD’s Purchasing Power Parity Index 
(private consumption, year 2009 average). The conversion rates are £1=¥189.3554 for UK workers, 
and €1=¥146.9663 for German workers. 9 
 
bound varies due to supply factors where some workers are forced to work shorter hours 
because of other responsibilities such as childbearing. 
The first line of equation (1) expresses that the status where the work hour 
constraint is below a worker’s desired level (when a worker answers that he/she wants 
to work more given the current hourly wage). In this status, the actual hours worked is 
determined at the upper bound. The second line represents the status where the worker’s 
actual and desired work hours coincide. In this status, hours worked are determined by 
both firm and worker factors. The third line is the status where the work hour constraint 
is above the worker’s desired level (when the worker answers that he/she wants to work 
less). In this status, the actual hours worked are determined at the lower bound. Since 
only labor demand behavior is reflected in the first and third statuses where hour 
constraints are binding, we suppose that Stewart and Swaffield’s (1997) framework 
consistently identifies the firm’s labor demand function for hours worked. 
As is often pointed out, it is important to note that when taking hours worked 
as an independent variable in the regression, the hourly wage taken as a dependent 
variable could be endogenous when there are measurement errors in the reported work 
hours. We therefore instrument hourly wage using industry dummies and job experience 
(total period engaged in the current job) for the cross-country estimations.
8 When  using 
Japanese firm-worker matched data for estimation, we also use the firm’s establishment 
year and return on sales in fiscal year 2008 as instruments. 
The likelihood function of equation (1) is as follows. 
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where  ϕ and Φ are the normal density and cumulative distribution functions, 
respectively, and σ is the standard deviation of the error term. We derive maximum 
likelihood estimates for (1) using the likelihood function (2). 
 
(3) Proxy variables for firm’s fixed costs of employment 
                                                  
8 As robustness checks, we confirmed that the estimation results do not significantly change when 
we use variables other than industry dummies or job experience as instruments, such as occupation 
dummies as instruments, or when we exclude hourly wage but include industry dummies and job 
experience. 10 
 
In the following estimation, we focus on the proxy variables for the firm’s fixed costs of 
employment. As discussed above, the firm would demand longer work hours if its fixed 
costs of employment are larger. As proxies for the fixed labor costs to firms, we 
consider the following variables. The first group includes job tenure at the current firm, 
university graduate dummy, and manager dummy, which takes a value of 1 for those 
with a management title. If Becker’s human capital theory holds, the job tenure in the 
firm should reflect the firm-specific skills, which would indicate larger fixed labor costs. 
Likewise, since it is usual for university graduates or managers to take larger hiring 
costs, university graduate and manager dummies may also reflect large fixed costs for 
firms. We employ the first group of variables to grasp how fixed-cost differences among 
individuals affect the variation in work hours among them. 
The second group we consider is the type of adjustment in the workplace. In 
the WLB-JE, the respondents are asked to answer whether each of the following 
practices applies to their workplace when long-term demand variations are projected: 
(a) labor hoarding of permanent employees (adjusting working hours of existing 
permanent employees or transferring permanent employees between departments), 
(b) labor hoarding of temporary employees (adjusting working hours of existing 
temporary employees or transferring temporary employees between departments), 
(c) adjustment of the number of permanent and temporary employees or outsourcing 
work). 
We assume the practice of labor hoarding of permanent employees is associated with 
longer work hours because some overtime hours are necessary as a buffer stock in case 
the firm has to decrease labor cost in recessions. Similarly, we believe that the more a 
firm practices labor hoarding of temporary employees and adjusts the number of 
employees, the less likely it is that the firm will save overtime hours as a buffer; 
therefore, the required lower bound for the permanent employees becomes shorter. The 
second-group variables are employed to grasp how fixed-cost differences among firms 
affect business cycle variation in work hours. 
In the matched firm-worker estimation, we also consider the proxy variables 
for fixed labor costs extracted from firm-side information. These include the volatility 
of permanent employees relative to output, the ratio of the seniority element in wage 
setting, the ratio of permanent employees, and the HR practices to train employees. The 
volatility of permanent employees relative to output is calculated using the variation of 
the number of permanent employees per year divided by the variation of total sales from 
BSBA during the period 1998 to 2008. This variable should stand for the degree of 
employment adjustment (or the inverse of labor hoarding for permanent employees) of 11 
 
each firm; therefore, we expect negative signs for the determinants of the lower bound 
in equation (1). The other three variables are expected to increase work hours since they 
indicate the firm’s fixed costs of employment; thus, we expect positive signs for the 
determinants of the lower bound. The above proxy variables for fixed labor costs and 
other variables used in the estimations are summarized in Table 4. 
 
 
IV. Estimation results using cross-country data 
 
(1) Basic characteristics and fixed-cost variables 
The estimation results using cross-country data for males and females are summarized 
in Tables 5(1) and (2), respectively. From Table 5(1) for males, we find the hourly wage 
is negatively and age positively correlated with firms’ demand for work hours in Japan. 
As for the proxy variables of fixed labor costs, tenure and tenure squared are significant 
for Japan. Although the coefficient of tenure squared is negative, it is shown that the 
marginal effect of job tenure on firms’ demand for work hours is positive until about 16 
years of tenure in Japan. Similarly, the manager dummy (the one incorporated in the 
lower bound) is significantly positive in all countries. 
  As expected, the positive effects of tenure and manager dummy on hours 
worked imply that the larger fixed costs of employment induce firms to demand longer 
work hours. It is inferred that firm-specific skills accumulate as the tenure increases 
and/or the management position rises since worker’s mobility among firms is very low, 
especially in Japan. It seems that the job tenure and the manager dummy are appropriate 
proxies of firms’ fixed costs in Japan. However, the job tenure might not necessarily be 
proper proxies for fixed costs in the UK and Germany, where labor mobility is higher. 
  In this regard, when we look at a dummy variable for labor hoarding of regular 
workers in Table 5(1), we find significantly positive effects on work hours in all 
countries. That is, those firms that cope with long-term demand variations by labor 
hoarding of permanent employees tend to set the lower bound of work hours higher. 
This is a direct evidence for the existence of overtime work as a buffer against 
unexpected demand variations. 
  The upper bound of work hours is considerably higher than the lower bound. In 
Table 5(1), the estimated upper bounds are 46% to 67% above the lower bounds and 
additionally 10% higher for Japanese managers. This result is consistent with the fact 
that a relatively smaller proportion of workers offer to work longer as shown in Table 1. 
It is also consistent with Stewart and Swaffield’s (1997) results. 12 
 
  Next, looking at Table 5(2) for females, we find that the estimated coefficients 
for job tenure and its squared are not significant for Japan and Germany, and the 
estimated signs were contrary to what we expected for the UK. The different results for 
the effects of job tenure between male and female employees in Japan might imply that 
the firm’s demand for work hours of females would differ from those of males since the 
proportion of those who work as assistants (therefore, the necessary skills are limited) is 
much larger for female employees. On the other hand, manager dummies (the one 
incorporated in lower bound) are significant for Japan and the UK and university 
graduate dummy is significant for the UK and Germany. These results presumably 
imply that manager and university graduate dummies would be proper proxies to reflect 
large fixed costs for females. The results indicated in the types of adjustment are 
partially consistent with what we expected. That is, the dummy variable for labor 
hoarding of temporary workers are significantly positive for the UK and Germany, 
indicating the possibility for the practice of longer work hours as a buffer of 
employment adjustment. 
  In sum, we can confirm from Table 5 that firms who bear large fixed costs for 
employees are more likely to require incumbent employees to work long hours. This 
feature is particularly evident in Japanese males, indicating that one of the possible 
factors for Japanese males to work long hours could be the large fixed costs of 
employment for accumulated human skills. In fact, as Table 4 shows, most of the proxy 
variables for fixed labor costs are larger in Japan than in the UK or Germany. For 
example, the job tenure is 6 to 7 years longer and the proportion of firms which practice   
labor hoarding of permanent employees is more than 20% larger in Japan. Therefore, 
both the larger fixed cost of employment and the larger effects of the fixed costs on 
work hours would bring about considerably longer hours worked by Japanese male 
employees. 
 
(2) HRM practices at workplace 
Even though the required work hours are determined by worker and firm characteristics 
such as human capital accumulations, HRM practices might increase or decrease the 
hours worked through a change in efficiency or productivity at the workplace. It is 
possible for us to examine this since the WLB-JE contains information on HRM 
practices at the workplace in the workers’ survey. 
Specifically, the WLB-JE asks the respondent workers to answer whether their 
job description is clearly defined, they have a lot of discretionary powers, the job is 
carried out in a team, and they are often faced with uncertainty. We compile job 13 
 
characteristics dummy variables that take 1 if the respondents answer “true” or 
“basically true” to each question and 0 otherwise. The WLB-JE also asks whether their 
manager evaluates those who work overtime or on holidays, is careful to allocate jobs 
efficiently, keeps good communications with the subordinates, and considers the 
subordinate’s work-life balance. We then make dummy variables to indicate manager’s 
types based on these questions. 
  Adding a set of these dummy variables of job characteristics and manager type 
to the variables used in Table 5, we estimate the above friction models. The estimation 
results are listed in Table 6. As for job characteristics, we see that a clearer job 
description is associated with shorter work hours for German males and Japanese 
females, which indicates that hours worked could be reduced through efficient 
management at the workplace. It is also shown that uncertainty would increase work 
hours in Japan and the UK. This result is consistent with the findings in the previous 
section: as the fixed costs of employment induce firms to demand longer work hours 
against future demand variations, longer work hours are needed in a workplace where 
uncertainty is large. 
  The manager type also affects the hours worked. For example, if managers tend 
to evaluate overtime work, work hours become longer for Japanese and UK workers. In 
addition, at workplaces where managers assign jobs efficiently, keep good 
communications with his/her workers, and consider the work-life balance of employees, 
work hours tend to become shorter for Japanese and UK males. These results imply that 
even if high fixed costs of employment may increase the demand for work hours, there 
is still room for reducing work hours by employing efficient managerial practices at 
workplaces. 
 
(3) Demand-side factors from matched firm-worker data 
The results obtained above are derived from information in the workers’ survey. 
Although we have utilized workplace information from the workers’ survey, it is more 
important and straightforward to use the information from the matched-firm survey 
when examining the effect of firm-side variables such as fixed cost of labor on work 
hours. Therefore, we use the matched firm-worker data, which are available only for 
Japanese workers in the WLB-JE, to further examine firms’ work hour demand by 
adding the firm-side information to equation (1). 
As described in Section III, we use the volatility of permanent employees 
relative to output, seniority in wage setting, ratio of regular employees, and HR 
practices to train employees. The estimation results are summarized in Table 7. The 14 
 
table shows that the coefficient of volatility of permanent employees relative to output 
is significantly negative for males. That is, for those firms that have exhibited lower 
employment adjustment (or larger labor hoarding) in the past decade, the lower bound 
of work hours tend to become higher. This is consistent with previous findings; possibly 
due to larger fixed costs of employment, those firms that practiced less employment 
adjustment in the previous recession tend to require the incumbent workers to work 
longer, to keep overtime work as a buffer to prepare for future demand variations. In 
Table 7, for female employees, however, the relative volatility is significantly positive, 
which contradicts our conjecture. 
  In Table 7, it is also found that the ratio of seniority element in wage setting is 
significantly positive for male employees, and that the ratio of regular workers is 
significantly positive for female employees. These results are consistent with the 
findings in Table 5 that the proxies for labor fixed cost are associated with longer work 
hours required by firms. 
  We also include the firm’s attitude to the work-life balance of their employees 
to see how these variables affect work hours. In the WLB-JE firm survey, firms are 
asked to answer how much they deal proactively with their workers’ work-life balance, 
using a scale of 0 to 10. The estimation results in Table 7 show that for females work 
hours get shorter as the firm deals more proactively with employees’ work-life balance. 
However, other variables such as a dummy for making efforts to reduce hours worked 
are not significant. 
 
 
V.  Conclusion 
 
Using information on workers’ preferences for work hours and a rich collection of 
matched firm-worker data, this paper investigated whether the number of hours worked 
is (partially) determined by demand-side factors, and tried to introduce one possibility 
to explain why Japanese tend to work longer than workers in other countries. 
Our results show that work hours are indeed determined by the demand-side 
factors; that is, each firm sets a minimum boundary of work hours, and workers hired in 
the firm cannot work less than the minimum requirement. The minimum requirement 
depends on the degree of labor-hoarding practices by the firm and the amount of fixed 
costs of labor that the firm bears. Specifically, firms that tend to conduct labor hoarding 
during recessions, presumably because of large fixed costs, require incumbent workers 
to work longer hours in normal times compared to firms that do not engage in such 15 
 
practices. We also found that the higher the firm-specific skills, the longer the firm’s 
requirement of work hours, given other things are equal. Since Japanese firms have long 
been considered to bear large costs to train workers, our findings are consistent with 
Rosen (1969), who points out that firms’ demand for hours worked is an increasing 
function of the user cost of labor, such as hiring and training costs. Given these results, 
we interpret the long work hour requirement as a rational strategy for Japanese firms to 
protect high-skill-accumulated workers from dismissal. To sum up, long work hours by 
Japanese workers reflect the long-term employment practice, a typical feature of the 
Japanese labor market. 
Even though each firm sets a certain lower bound of work hours and Japanese 
firms are more likely to set such a boundary higher relative to other countries due to 
large fixed costs, it would be reasonable to think that a worker who wants to work less 
can be sorted and matched with firms that offer short working hours. Therefore, in the 
long run, there would be no divergence between actual and desired work hours. 
However, a possible implication suggested from the findings in this paper is that such 
sorting and matching are less likely to occur under an environment where mobility costs 
are very high, such as in the Japanese labor market. This does not mean that there is no 
room for the Japanese to achieve a work-life-balance even under such a traditional 
labor-hoarding environment. For example, our findings suggest that good HRM 
practices can serve as a device to lower firms’ demand of work hours where hours 
worked are inefficiently long. Introducing German-type short-hour policies supported 
by unemployment insurance may also be worth considering to make firms’ work hour 
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Table 1 Weekly hours worked 
 
Female
Japan UK Germany Japan UK Germany
Original
Weekly hours worked 46.91 42.01 43.31 42.06 38.19 39.08
(8.09) (8.51) (7.11) (5.55) (8.93) (7.92)
Ratio of long-hour workers
 More than 50 hours 0.38 0.16 0.20 0.11 0.08 0.09
(0.49) (0.37) (0.40) (0.32) (0.28) (0.28)
 More than 60 hours 0.10 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.02
(0.30) (0.21) (0.21) (0.13) (0.19) (0.13)
Adjusted
Weekly hours worked 46.91 41.09 43.52 42.06 38.13 38.95
(2.08) (3.93) (2.63) (1.41) (4.08) (2.55)
Ratio of long-hour workers
 More than 50 hours 0.38 0.23 0.24 0.11 0.06 0.03
(0.11) (0.18) (0.14) (0.08) (0.08) (0.05)
 More than 60 hours 0.10 0.12 0.06 0.02 0.03 0.02
(0.06) (0.14) (0.08) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08)
Male
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
 
Table 2 Weekly hours worked in representative panel data 
 
Japan UK Germany Japan UK Germany
(KHPS) (BHPS) (GSEOP) (KHPS) (BHPS) (GSEOP)
2004-2008
Weekly hours worked 51.65 42.47 45.10 44.98 36.78 36.67
(10.88) (9.30) (7.84) (8.96) (9.55) (9.44)
0.59 0.21 0.29 0.27 0.09 0.08
(0.49) (0.40) (0.45) (0.44) (0.28) (0.28)
Observations 4012 1982 8317 1635 2993 8662
2010






Ratio of workers working
more than 50 hours
Ratio of workers working
more than 50 hours
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors.20 
 
 
Table 3 Preferences for hours worked 
 
Female
Japan UK Germany Japan UK Germany
Preferences to change work hours
Increase 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.10
(0.28) (0.31) (0.29) (0.25) (0.30) (0.30)
Not change 0.68 0.76 0.85 0.67 0.70 0.84
(0.47) (0.43) (0.36) (0.47) (0.46) (0.37)
Decrease 0.24 0.14 0.07 0.26 0.20 0.07
(0.43) (0.34) (0.25) (0.44) (0.40) (0.25)
-1.58 -0.83 -0.07 -1.59 -1.65 -0.08
(6.34) (7.66) (3.72) (4.74) (7.69) (5.42)
Observations 5053 395 461 2262 431 419
Male
Number of work hours that
workers prefer to change
 
 
Note: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 21 
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics for explanatory variables 
 
 
Japan UK Germany Japan UK Germany
Hourly wage 0.22 0.27 0.33 0.16 0.22 0.26
(0.09) (0.13) (0.15) (0.06) (0.10) (0.11)
Age 40.75 41.39 38.90 35.26 37.39 36.93
(9.25) (10.18) (9.71) (9.25) (10.68) (9.83)
Tenure 14.72 8.11 7.79 11.04 6.64 7.59
(9.92) (6.11) (5.87) (8.80) (5.52) (6.25)
Manager dummy 0.69 0.44 0.37 0.22 0.34 0.24
(0.46) (0.50) (0.48) (0.41) (0.47) (0.43)
University graduate dummy 0.64 0.12 0.09 0.34 0.11 0.06
(0.48) (0.32) (0.29) (0.47) (0.31) (0.23)
Type of adjustment in workplace
0.73 0.47 0.50 0.69 0.47 0.45
(0.64) (0.66) (0.67) (0.63) (0.64) (0.63)
0.16 0.42 0.40 0.16 0.31 0.35
(0.43) (0.67) (0.63) (0.43) (0.57) (0.60)
0.57 0.74 0.96 0.47 0.72 0.82
(0.81) (1.06) (1.07) (0.76) (1.01) (1.07)
Spouse dummy 0.72 0.27 0.34 0.40 0.38 0.36
(0.45) (0.44) (0.47) (0.49) (0.48) (0.48)
Child dummy 0.12 0.15 0.11 0.05 0.19 0.15
(0.33) (0.35) (0.32) (0.22) (0.39) (0.35)
Job experience 11.37 9.60 9.50 10.38 7.68 9.08
(9.09) (6.26) (6.19) (8.12) (5.69) (6.65)
Firm matched variables
Relative volatility of employment  0.01 0.01
to output (0.02) (0.02)
Seniority in wage setting 0.23 0.23
(0.27) (0.27)
Ratio of regular employees 0.76 0.76
(0.26) (0.26)
Employee training dummy 0.86 0.82
(0.35) (0.38)
Extent how much firms deal proactively  5.74 5.77
with their workers’ WLB (0 to 10) (1.87) (1.93)
Work hour reduction policy 0.27 0.25
(0.44) (0.43)
Establishment year 1957.1 1957.3
(20.02) (20.61)
Return on sales (fiscal year 2008) 0.02 0.02
(0.06) (0.06)
Observations 5,053 395 461 2,262 431 419
Labor hoarding of permanent workers
Labor hoarding of temporary workers





Note: 1. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 








(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 2.77** 2.74** 3.61** 3.59** 3.86** 3.87**
(0.20) (0.20) (0.24) (0.23) (0.23) (0.23)
Log wage rate -0.42** -0.43** 0.05 0.04 0.12 0.14
(0.08) (0.08) (0.14) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
Age 0.01** 0.01** -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure 0.01** 0.01** 0.01 0.01 -0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure squared /100 -0.02** -0.02** -0.06 -0.05 -0.01 -0.02
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
University graduate dummy 0.02+ 0.02+ 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06)
Manager dummy 0.05** 0.05** 0.10+ 0.10+ 0.13* 0.12*
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)







Gamma 0.46** 0.46** 0.65** 0.65** 0.67** 0.66**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Manager dummy 0.10** 0.10** -0.05 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Spouse dummy -0.01 -0.01 -0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.02
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Child dummy -0.03+ -0.03+ -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
Theta 0.28** 0.28** 0.31** 0.31** 0.33** 0.33**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Log likelihood -3254 -3251 -272.9 -270.3 -330.0 -327.5









Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 3.45** 3.45** 3.18** 3.18** 3.31** 3.25**
(0.29) (0.29) (0.32) (0.33) (0.22) (0.23)
Log wage rate -0.10 -0.10 -0.24 -0.23 0.04 0.04
(0.12) (0.12) (0.21) (0.22) (0.16) (0.16)
Age 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Tenure 0.00 0.00 -0.02+ -0.02+ -0.01 -0.01
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tenure squared /100 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.09+ -0.01 -0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
University graduate dummy 0.03 0.03 0.16* 0.16* 0.22+ 0.20+
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11)
Manager dummy 0.05* 0.05* 0.14* 0.14* -0.02 -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)







Gamma 0.42** 0.42** 0.65** 0.65** 0.86** 0.86**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.10)
Manager dummy 0.00 0.00 -0.00 -0.01 0.11 0.11
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.12) (0.12)
Spouse dummy -0.00 -0.00 -0.05 -0.04 -0.05 -0.04
(0.02) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)
Child dummy -0.02 -0.02 0.13 0.14 -0.21* -0.23*
(0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09)
Theta 0.22** 0.22** 0.36** 0.35** 0.41** 0.40**
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04)
Log likelihood -1164 -1163 -321.0 -318.0 -307.2 -302.3









Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
2. **, *, and + indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 24 
 
 
Table 6 Cross-country estimations: The effects of job and HRM characteristics 
 
Japan UK Germany Japan UK Germany
Job characteristics dummies (true or basically true = 1)
Job description is clearly defined -0.00 0.01 -0.09+ -0.04** 0.01 0.04
(0.01) (0.06) (0.05) (0.01) (0.06) (0.08)
Having a lot of discretionary powe -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.03
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
Carried out in a team 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.01 -0.06 0.05
(0.01) (0.05) (0.04) (0.01) (0.05) (0.05)
Facing a lot of uncertainty 0.07** 0.11** 0.06 0.02* 0.12** 0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05)
Manager's type dummies (true or basically true = 1)
Evaluate overtime 0.04** 0.11* 0.03 0.02+ 0.11* -0.04
(0.01) (0.05) (0.06) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06)
Assign job equally -0.03** -0.10* -0.04 -0.02 -0.06 -0.10+
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.06)
Keep good communication -0.03** 0.12** 0.04 0.01 -0.03 0.07
(0.01) (0.05) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07)
Consider work-life-balance -0.02* -0.12** 0.02 -0.02 -0.03 -0.01
(0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.06)
Log likelihood -3156 -256.3 -323.3 -1124 -306.9 -299.9




Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
2. **, *, and + indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % levels, respectively. 
3. All explanatory variables in Table 5 are also included. 25 
 
 
Table 7 Firm-worker matched estimations 
 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Firm matched variables
Relative volatility of employment to output -0.49* -0.51* 0.56** 0.52*
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Seniority in wage setting 0.05** 0.05** -0.01 -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Ratio of regular employees -0.00 -0.00 0.03 0.04+
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Employee training dummy 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02+
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Extent how much firms deal proactively  -0.00 -0.01+ -0.01** -0.01**
with their workers’ WLB (0 to 10) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Making efforts to reduce work hour -0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.00
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Log likelihood -2403 -2408 -2401 -656.0 -655.9 -650.7
Observations 3,735 3,735 3,735 1,457 1,457 1,457
Male Female
 
Notes: 1. Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. 
2. **, *, and + indicate statistical significance at the 1 %, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 































































































































20 40 60 80
Actual hours worked
(d) German
 
 
 